IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION SHIRLEY COHEN AND HANNAH COHEN, Plaintiffs, v. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, MEMPHIS AND SHELBY COUNTY AIRPORT AUTHORITY, and MEMPHIS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants.
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No. 16-cv-2529-SHL-cgc
ORDER DENYING PROPOSED INTERVENOR’S PRO SE MOTION TO INTERVENE, DENYING PROPOSED INTERVENOR’S PRO SE MOTION FOR CM/ECF ACCESS AND DENYING PROPOSED INTERVENOR’S PRO SE MOTION TO COMPEL
Before the Court is individual third-party proposed intervenor, Sai’s, 1 Motion to Intervene (ECF No. 30), Motion for CM/ECF Access (ECF No. 31) and Motion to Compel (ECF No. 32), each filed on September 15, 2016. Defendant Transportation Security Administration (the “TSA”) filed its Response to Sai’s motions on September 30, 2016 (ECF No. 44), to which Defendants Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority (“MSCAA”) and Memphis International Airport Police Department (“Airport Police”) joined in full on October 4, 2016 (ECF No. 45). 2 As explained herein, the Court DENIES Sai’s Motion to Intervene, and, therefore, DENIES as moot Sai’s Motion for CM/ECF Access and their Motion to Compel. 1
The proposed intervenor has indicated that “Sai” is their full legal name. Because Sai has stated a slight preference for gender-neutral pronouns, the Court will refer to the proposed intervenor as “Sai,” the “proposed intervenor” or “they.” See https://s.ai/iaq. 2 Sai filed a Reply, including an unopposed motion for leave, on October 21, 2016. (ECF No. 47.) The Court GRANTS the Motion for leave to file a Reply, which is considered herein.
Plaintiffs Hannah and Shirley Cohen have brought claims against the TSA, the MSCAA and the Airport Police, alleging state-law tort claims and discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”). The claims stem from events that occurred on June 30, 2015, when Plaintiff Hannah Cohen was allegedly assaulted and falsely arrested while moving through a mandatory security screening at the Memphis International Airport. Sai requests that the Court allow them to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) and (b)(1), arguing that intervention is necessary “for the limited purpose of asserting First Amendment and common law Intervenor’s rights to access judicial records.” (ECF No. 30 at 1.) They “do[] not assert any interest in the merits of th[e] case; only in access to the records thereof.” (Id.) Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), a court must permit anyone to intervene who “claims an interest relating . . . to the transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1) gives the court discretion to permit intervention where a party “(A) is given a conditional right to intervene by federal statute; or (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” The Court has discretion as to whether a party has sufficient interest in a case to warrant intervention. See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 424 F.3d 438, 445 (6th Cir. 2005). Although a non-party with no actual legal interest does not fit squarely within the language of Rule 24, “nonparties may permissively intervene for the purpose of challenging confidentiality orders.” EEOC v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Sai specifically indicates that they assert no interest in the merits of the case, so they have no right to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Sai argues that special circumstances
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warrant granting permissive intervention of a non-party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1), for the limited purpose of gaining access to information that was filed under seal or otherwise shielded from public view by a protective order. Here, there are no documents currently filed under seal or subject to any order requiring confidentiality. The Court appreciates the long-standing legal tradition of public access to its records, but Sai has not shown how intervening as a party here is necessary for that access. Not only are the documents in this matter available, there are also alternative methods to obtain information from these parties if it is not filed with the Court – including through the state and federal open records requests. The Court hereby DENIES Sai’s Pro Se Motion to Intervene, and, because Sai is not a party to this case, DENIES Sai’s Pro Se Motion for CM/ECF Access and Pro Se Motion to Compel. The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this Order to the proposed Intervenor, Sai, at 500 Westover Dr. #4514, Sanford, NC 27330. IT IS SO ORDERED, this 8th day of November, 2016. s/ Sheryl H. Lipman SHERYL H. LIPMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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