Published online ahead of print April 27, 2009

Organization Science

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Articles in Advance, pp. 1–3 issn 1047-7039
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doi 10.1287/orsc.1090.0433 © 2009 INFORMS

Performativity of Theory, Arbitrary Conventions, and Possible Worlds: A Reality Check Teppo Felin

Marriott School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84602, [email protected]

Nicolai J. Foss

Center for Strategic Management and Globalization, Copenhagen Business School, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark, and Department of Strategy and Management, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, N-5045 Bergen, Norway, [email protected]

W

e argue that Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton build on a scientifically problematic conception of the relationship between theory and social reality. Specifically, the performativity perspective that they build on makes tenuous assumptions about the role that theories, whether true or not, play in strongly constructing social reality, but the perspective fundamentally ignores central matters related to human nature and the boundaries of possibility. We argue for a more realistic approach to theory building and social science, one that recognizes the role that true theories play in helping us understand and explain reality, but also in turn shaping that reality given this better theoretical understanding. Key words: performativity; economics; philosophy of social science History: Published online in Articles in Advance.

We appreciate the opportunity to briefly address Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton’s (2009) response (henceforth “FPS”). Given space constraints, we will largely focus on the merits and implicit assumptions of the “performativity perspective” that FPS build on heavily (Callon 1998, 2007). As FPS emphasize in their response, their arguments build on a much wider literature in the philosophy and sociology of science, the performativity perspective. The performativity literature argues that theories (predictions, assumptions, explanations, and expectations), independent of ex ante correspondence with truth and reality, fulfill themselves due to social, political, and technical reasons, and create the very realities that the theories predict. According to the performativity perspective, then, we cannot even meaningfully speak of the ex ante “truth” or “reality” of theories, because theories themselves participate in defining and creating what is truthful and what is real. Theories, as argued by one of the founders of this perspective, are “arbitrary conventions” (Callon 2007, p. 322) that are self-fulfilling (MacKenzie 2006)—arbitrary conventions that are not true ex ante but they “perform” themselves and thus become true ex post. The problem, however, is that if one holds that the content of theories indeed is arbitrary ex ante, how is one then somehow able to assess the falsity or truth of other’s theories? Logically, one cannot—any assertions of the falsity or truth of theories would be self-

refuting. But FPS nonetheless reduce other’s theoretical efforts, particularly in mainstream economics, not just to arbitrariness but false ideology. Logically, the performativity perspective must also reduce its own theoretical efforts to historical, ex post story telling and labeling (MacKenzie 2006), or worse, politics and ideology. If not truth, what then should be the basis for choosing a particular theory over others? On this front, the performativity perspective develops an agenda that radically changes the very purposes of science, specifically, where social scientists “no longer have to choose between interpreting the world and transforming it” (Callon 1998, p. 352). Competition, self-interest, incentives, and markets (or any other factor for that matter) may just be arbitrary, cultural or theoretical constructions; in line with this agenda, the “point [of the performativity perspective] is to question the very naturalness of markets” (Fourcade 2007, p. 1025; cf. MacKenzie 2009). Indeed, if the content of our theories is arbitrary, then why not create the best of all possible worlds? But, even if we reduce theoretical efforts to ideology, an immediate question then is which of many competing ideologies ought to be adopted and why? Thus, ironically, we come back to the need to judge the ex ante content of the theory itself, along with associated evidence. The problem is that the performativity perspective does not allow for any form of ex ante judgment about the potential correctness of given theories because “there are no context-free or supercultural norms of rationality” 1

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(Barnes and Bloor 1982, p. 27) by which to judge truth. An additional problem is that the performativity perspective only focuses on selective, ex post evidence for its arguments, and thus the approach amounts to the stalking of various historical models and all-too opportunistically pointing out how (some of) these models changed or constructed the world. In other words, the performativity perspective—as a recent incarnation of the science studies program, which failed (Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2007, cf. Latour and Woolgar 1979)—never addresses the range of possible, other (ex ante “arbitrary,” “false,” or “true”), competing theories that may potentially also have been realized nor the possibility of meaningful progress. Might, for example, the Black-Sholes model have worked better than other ex ante approaches to understanding option value? Undoubtedly so, which is partly why it was used; thus, one can scarcely label the model as arbitrary. Did prices come to reflect the model? Yes. Was the model the perfect tool? No, in fact, no model is (science indeed progresses over time), but the model provided an approximation and one that was later checked by “reality” and modified accordingly. Overall, then, the range of “possible worlds” that social scientists might create are bounded by ex ante realities, realities that one cannot transform by simply theorizing and hoping, and thus making them come true (cf. Austin 1962, Bloor 1991, Butler 1997). For example, scarcity and costs are a reality. No amount of theorizing will change this. Human universals and nature are an ex ante reality (Brown 1991): some people are self-interested, others are selfless; some people are motivated by extrinsic factors, others perhaps not; some are talented in particular areas, others are not. Understanding these ex ante realities is fundamental to theorizing, and these realities cannot be labeled arbitrary (Felin and Foss 2009). Might, then, for example, market institutions actually protect from opportunistic behavior rather than create it (Williamson 1985)? The bulk of evidence in Ferraro et al. (2005) for the self-fulfilling nature of theories comes from their extension of the performativity argument into the literature on how people’s expectations or stereotypes of others fulfill themselves, even when false. But, to say that people blindly follow inaccurate stereotypes is to deny rationality, free will, and individuating information. That is, review studies persuasively show that individuating information and accurate informational updating drives stereotypes rather than stereotypes falsely fulfilling themselves (see Funder 1995, Jussim et al. 2009, Jussim and Harber 2005). We might also add that the Ferraro et al. (2005) language “mechanism” builds on an antiquated conception of the supposedly strong influence that language has on behavior, perceptions, and the construction of reality. Specifically, the thesis of linguistic determinism (Sapir 1911), relativism, and performativity has been refuted by studies in linguistics and psychology

Felin and Foss: Crossroads

Organization Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–3, © 2009 INFORMS

(for an overview, see Pinker 2007) as well as philosophy (Searle 1989). A final concern with FPS’s arguments is that they have, perhaps inadvertently, taken a rather definitive stand with the strongly social constructionist side in the so-called “science wars” (Boghossian 2006, Brown 2001, Goldman 1999) by heavily anchoring their arguments on the performativity perspective. But, if organizational scholars want to be taken seriously, then we cannot simply reduce science to arbitrary convention, rhetoric, and ideology. Thus, our hope is that a modicum of reality is infused into interdisciplinary discussions, and that the arguments and evidence rather than rhetoric and ideology drive the joint effort to create the best of all possible worlds. References

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Felin and Foss: Crossroads

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Organization Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–3, © 2009 INFORMS

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